Track 4 · The House · lesson 6
The float
13 min
Track 4 · The House · lesson 6
13 min
You are running the insurer now.
The underwriting result has been negative for nine consecutive years. Every year the company has paid out more in claims and costs than it took in premiums. Every year. The board has just approved a dividend.
Before you read on, commit to an answer.
Predict
A premium arrives in January. The claim it eventually pays might be settled in March, or in four years, or — for an injury claim being argued over — in eleven.
Between those two dates, the insurer is holding money that is not its own. It will have to be paid out. In the meantime, the insurer decides where it sits.
The float is the money an insurer holds between collecting premiums and paying claims.
It is not profit and it is not capital. It is a liability that has not come due yet. What makes it extraordinary is its shape: it does not have to be rolled over, no lender can demand it back on a Tuesday, and as long as the business keeps writing policies it is replenished faster than it drains.
An insurer writing a million a year in premiums, on business where claims take three years to settle, is permanently holding around three million of other people's money.
This is the same model as the last lesson with one more control released. The underwriting is now set to lose money: a combined ratio of 104, a four percent loss on every premium, every year, for ten years.
The return on the float starts at zero. Move it.
Insurance float
Hypothetical model, not a forecast
Premiums in, claims and expenses out, and the money held in between put to work.
It assumes
It ignores
Find the return on the float at which ten years of unbroken underwriting losses become a profit overall. Read the number carefully before you decide whether to be surprised.
| Year | Underwriting result | Investment income | Cumulative total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | -40k | 0 | -40k |
| 2 | -41.2k | 0 | -81.2k |
| 3 | -42.4k | 0 | -124k |
| 4 | -43.7k | 0 | -167k |
| 5 | -45k | 0 | -212k |
| 6 | -46.4k | 0 | -259k |
| 7 | -47.8k | 0 | -306k |
| 8 | -49.2k | 0 | -356k |
| 9 | -50.7k | 0 | -406k |
| 10 | -52.2k | 0 | -459k |
Not there yet — keep moving the controls.
One point four percent.
That is the whole thing. A company losing money on every policy it writes, in every one of ten consecutive years, turns a profit if the money it is holding in the meantime earns more than one and a half percent.
Look at the figure the model labels what the float costs. It is 1.33 percent — the four-point underwriting loss divided by a float three times the size of annual premiums. That is this insurer's cost of borrowing. It is available in unlimited quantity, it has no maturity date, and no committee has to approve the renewal.
Check
Now the interesting part, and the reason this lesson is written from your side of the desk.
If the float is worth more than the underwriting costs, the underwriting is not the point. It is a means of gathering float. And two levers change how much float a given amount of premium produces.
The first is how much you are willing to lose on the insurance itself. Price more cheaply, accept a worse loss ratio, write more business.
The second is subtler and much more powerful: write the kind of insurance where claims take a long time to settle. Motor damage settles in weeks. A liability claim argued through courts settles in years. The same premium held for five years instead of one is five times the float.
The return below is fixed at five percent. You control the loss ratio and how long the claims take.
Insurance float
Hypothetical model, not a forecast
Premiums in, claims and expenses out, and the money held in between put to work.
It assumes
It ignores
Build the position: the underwriting must lose more than 100,000 in the final year, and the company must still be profitable over the decade. Then look at which of the two controls did the work.
How long claims take to settle decides how much money is held in the meantime.
| Year | Underwriting result | Investment income | Total result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | -40k | 25k | -15k |
| 2 | -41.2k | 25.8k | -15.4k |
| 3 | -42.4k | 26.5k | -15.9k |
| 4 | -43.7k | 27.3k | -16.4k |
| 5 | -45k | 28.1k | -16.9k |
| 6 | -46.4k | 29k | -17.4k |
| 7 | -47.8k | 29.9k | -17.9k |
| 8 | -49.2k | 30.7k | -18.4k |
| 9 | -50.7k | 31.7k | -19k |
| 10 | -52.2k | 32.6k | -19.6k |
Not there yet — keep moving the controls.
The loss ratio makes the hole. The float multiple decides whether the hole matters. At half a year of float, a four-point underwriting loss is fatal within a decade. At three years of float, a twelve-point loss is comfortably profitable — and the second insurer looks far worse than the first on every figure a customer or a journalist would ever see.
This is why the same underwriting result means completely different things at different insurers, and why comparing combined ratios across lines of business is close to meaningless.
An insurer writing short-tail cover needs a combined ratio below 100 to survive. An insurer writing long-tail cover can run above it indefinitely, and the more patient its claims are, the further above it can go.
The trade is not free. Long-tail business is where the estimates are worst, and an insurer that has been wrong about its reserves for eight years finds out all at once.
Float is not an insurance invention. It is what happens whenever a business is paid before it delivers, and it is sitting in your own spending.
Check
Three things stop this being the free money it can sound like.
The float is owed. A bad catastrophe year calls it in early, and it is called in at exactly the moment investment markets are usually down, because the things that damage economies damage both sides at once.
Leverage works downwards. Holding three times your premium income in investments means a ten percent investment loss costs you thirty percent of a year's revenue, on top of whatever the underwriting did.
Competition gives most of it away. Insurers know the float is valuable, so they compete for it by cutting premiums, which is precisely how the industry arrives at a combined ratio above 100 in the first place. The reason your cover costs less than the expected claims plus expenses is that somebody wants to hold your money in the meantime.
That last one is worth sitting with. The mechanism this lesson has spent thirteen minutes on is also the reason insurance is cheaper than it would otherwise be.
Who pays. Policyholders, in the gap between paying today and being paid later — a gap they receive no interest on, and which is priced into the premium only through competition.
Who benefits. The insurer, on the investment return over the cost of the float. And the policyholder, through a premium lower than the claims and expenses alone would justify.
Who carries the risk. Split, and this is the part that matters. The insurer carries the investment risk. The policyholder carries the risk that the insurer loses on both sides at once and cannot pay — which is what capital requirements and guarantee schemes exist to cover, and why an insurer's balance sheet is regulated far more tightly than its prices.